Chain of Fools: Why the Admissibility Bar Should Be Raised for Drug Evidence by White, Charles
Louisiana Law Review 
Volume 81 
Number 2 Winter 2021 Article 7 
3-22-2021 
Chain of Fools: Why the Admissibility Bar Should Be Raised for 
Drug Evidence 
Charles White 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Charles White, Chain of Fools: Why the Admissibility Bar Should Be Raised for Drug Evidence, 81 La. L. 
Rev. (2021) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol81/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 






    
    
    
    
    
    
     
     
    
   
   
     
     
     
     




   
  
 
   
    
   
  
   
The Chain of Fools: Why the Admissibility Bar 




I. Authentication Framework........................................................... 434
II. Chain-of-Custody Framework...................................................... 435
III. Sixth-Amendment Framework..................................................... 436
IV. Drug Evidence.............................................................................. 437
V. The Admissibility of Drug Evidence............................................ 437
A. The Business-as-Usual Approach.......................................... 437
B. The Stricter Approach............................................................ 438
VI. Raising the Bar ............................................................................. 439
A. The Higher Forgery Risk Associated 
with Drug Evidence ............................................................... 440
B. The Impracticability of Standard Admissibility .................... 441
1. Dogs ................................................................................ 441
2. Scales............................................................................... 442
3. Analysis Equipment ........................................................ 443
Conclusion.................................................................................... 446
INTRODUCTION
Leroy Coty’s case started and ended with cocaine. Law enforcement
searched Coty’s vehicle and discovered one bag of cocaine inside a Golden
Puffs cereal box.1 After pleading guilty to possession of a controlled
Copyright 2021, by CHARLES WHITE.
* University of South Carolina School of Law, J.D., 2015. Chapman
University Fowler School of Law, Master of Laws LL.M. with an emphasis in
Taxation, 2019.
1. Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
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434 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.81
substance, Coty filed for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the crime
lab failed to properly test the cocaine as a controlled substance that he had
possessed.2 
In addressing the issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas noted
that courts have applied two conflicting approaches regarding the
admissibility of drug evidence. Most courts apply a traditional
admissibility standard based on the assumption that the risk of forgery
exists with any evidence.3 Other courts, however, impose a higher
admissibility bar based on forgery concerns unique to drug evidence.4 This
Article argues against the majority approach and in favor of a more
stringent admissibility standard for drug evidence.
I. AUTHENTICATION FRAMEWORK
Before a party can introduce evidence, it must first provide some
indication that the evidence is what the party claims it to be, i.e., it must
authenticate the evidence.5 For example, a prosecutor seeking to introduce a
confession note allegedly written by the defendant must first present evidence
that the defendant in fact wrote the letter.6 According to Federal Rule of
Evidence 901(a), “To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying 
an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to
support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.”7 
This authentication standard is the same as the conditional relevance
standard contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b):8 if a reasonable
juror could find the conditional fact—authentication—by a preponderance
of the evidence, Rule 901(a) has been satisfied.9 
2. Id. at 602.
3. Id. at 603.
4. Id.
5. Colin Miller & Charles White, The Social Medium: Why the
Authentication Bar Should Be Raised For Social Media Evidence, 87 TEMP. L.
REV. ONLINE 1, 2 (2014).
6. Id.
7. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
8. See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (“When the relevance of evidence depends on
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that
the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition
that the proof be introduced later.”).
9. See United States v. Branch, 970 F.2d 1368, 1370 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating 
that authenticity is a question for the jury and indicating that admissibility is
governed by the procedure set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b)).
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4352021] THE CHAIN OF FOOLS
Rule 901(a) allows for a party to exclude drug evidence. In Loper v.
State,10 “[t]he State sought to establish a long and complicated chain of
custody concerning the cocaine.”11 According to the Supreme Court of
Delaware:
Because of the foregoing circumstances, and the additional
problem that the cocaine field tested and cocaine tested by the
Medical Examiner’s office were of questionable similarity, the
State cannot be said to have established a valid chain of custody.
As a result, the cocaine was not properly authenticated in
accordance with [Delaware Uniform Rules of Evidence] 901(a).12 
Meanwhile, a party can exclude narcotics through authentication
without Rule 901. In Crisco v. State,13 Keith Crisco showed that the State 
failed to prove that the drug tested was properly authenticated.14 
According to the Supreme Court of Arkansas:
In the case before us, Crisco hinges his contention of lack of
authenticity on the fact that Officer Hanes’s description of the
drugs differed significantly from that of the chemist, Michael
Stage, in color and consistency. In fact, the chemist admitted that
he would not have described the substance as off-white powder.
Crisco’s point has merit. True, there was no obvious break in the
chain of custody of the envelope containing the plastic bag or
conclusive proof that any tampering transpired.15 
The court then acknowledged, “Yet, the marked difference in the
description of the substance by Officer Hanes and the chemist leads us to 
the conclusion that there is a significant possibility that the evidence tested
was not the same as that purchased by Officer Hanes.”16 
II. CHAIN-OF-CUSTODY FRAMEWORK
A court can exclude drug evidence because of chain-of-custody issues.
In Abbott v. State,17 Richard Abbott showed that the State failed to
10. See Loper v. State, No. 580, 1992, 1994 WL 10820 (Del. Jan. 3, 1994).
11. Id. at *1.
12. Id. at *5.
13. Crisco v. State, 943 S.W.2d 582 (Ark. 1997).
14. Id. at 583.
15. Id. at 585.
16. Id.
17. Abbot v. State, No. 54813, 2010 WL 3497642, at *1 (Nev. July 6, 2010).
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436 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.81
establish a chain of custody for the evidence and therefore did not present
sufficient evidence to support his conviction.18 According to the Supreme
Court of Nevada: 
Based on the trial testimony, we determine that the State 
failed to establish an apparent link between the single
clear package that [the officer] testified he confiscated 
from Abbott’s body during the unclothed search and the
four bags of white powdery substance [that other officers]
testified to having seen on a table in the drug testing room
at CCDC.19 
III. SIXTH-AMENDMENT FRAMEWORK
The following decisions provide illustrations of ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel issues in drug cases. In McBride v. State,20 the 
determination that Israel McBride was not entitled to the appointment of a
chemist to assist in his defense was reversed.21 The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas found that “[f]rom these cases we conclude that, to 
meaningfully participate in the judicial process, an indigent defendant
must have the same right to inspection as a non-indigent defendant.”22 
As another example of ineffective assistance of counsel, in United
States v. Smith,23 Major Eric B. Smith showed that Major BG’s 
performance was deficient in failing to obtain the litigation packet for the
negative hair follicle test in time to evaluate its potential for admission in
the event that the tactical decision was made to admit the negative test
result as substantive evidence.24 According to the U.S. Army Court of
Criminal Appeals, “The record demonstrate[d] a reasonable likelihood
that the hair follicle test was admissible and sufficiently reliable to warrant
a reasonable defense counsel to obtain it in advance of trial, evaluate it,
consider its admission, and if admitted, emphasize its weight on findings
and, if necessary, sentencing.”25 
18. Id.
19. Id. at *2.
20. McBride v. State, 838 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
21. Id. at 249.
22. Id. at 252.
23. United States v. Smith, ARMY 20120918, 2015 WL 4400220 (A. Ct. 
Crim. App. July 17, 2015).
24. Id. at *8–10.
25. Id. at *10.
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4372021] THE CHAIN OF FOOLS
IV. DRUG EVIDENCE
According to the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Ex parte
Coty,26 a single laboratory technician might work on 4,944 cases during a
six-year tenure.27 Attorneys are increasingly introducing narcotic evidence 
at trial. For example, in State v. Conlin,28 police officers found marijuana, 
evidence of an operation to grow marijuana, and several guns while
executing a search warrant at Stephen Conlin’s residence on October 22,
2010.29 During two subsequent searches, officers found marijuana in a
shed in Conlin’s backyard.30 Conlin was convicted for possession of five
or more kilograms of marijuana with intent to sell.31 Later, the Court of
Appeals of Minnesota reversed.32 The court noted it was aware of only one
case where “nonscientific evidence alone was sufficient to establish the
identity and weight of a suspected controlled substance.”33 The court
found that “the state failed to produce evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,
that Conlin possessed with intent to manufacture one or more mixtures of
a total weight of five kilograms or more containing marijuana.”34 
V. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DRUG EVIDENCE
A comparison of standards that courts apply to drug evidence reflects
two methods. There is a business-as-usual method and a stricter method. 
A. The Business-as-Usual Approach
Confronted with narcotic evidence, most courts have applied the
traditional approach to admissibility, typically relying on law not
customized to narcotics. For instance, in People v. Jones,35 Tony Jones
was arrested for the possession of five separate packets containing a white,
rocky substance that the police believed to be a controlled substance.36 
26. Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
27. Id. at 599.
28. State v. Conlin, No. A13-0666, 2014 WL 1272118 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar.
31, 2014).
29. Id. at *1.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *2.
32. Id.
33. Id. at *6.
34. Id. at *7.
35. People v. Jones, 675 N.E.2d 99 (Ill. 1996).
36. Id. at 100.
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  48 2/5/21  12:55 PM





   
  
   
  
   
  
  
   
 
 
   
   
   
  
   
  




    
   
  
 
    
  
 
   
   
   
   
   
    
    
   
    
   
   
438 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.81
Before trial, the State selected two of the five packets and tested their
contents.37 The contents of the remaining three packets were not tested.38 
Jones was tried and convicted of possession with intent to deliver 1.4
grams of cocaine, the combined amount that was contained in all five
packets.39 The appellate court reversed, finding that the evidence only
supported defendant’s possession of 0.59 grams of cocaine with intent to
deliver.40 The Supreme Court of Illinois later agreed, concluding as
follows:
When a defendant is charged with possession of a specific amount
of an illegal drug with intent to deliver and there is a lesser
included offense of possession of a smaller amount, then the
weight of the seized drug is an essential element of the crime and
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.41 
The court acknowledged that “the chemist failed to test a sufficient number
of packets to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed
one gram or more of cocaine.”42 But the court concluded that a chemist
generally need not test every sample seized in order to render an opinion
as to the makeup of the substance of the whole.43 
B. The Stricter Approach
Other courts have raised the admissibility bar in cases involving 
narcotic evidence. In State v. Roche,44 James Roche and Roy Sweeney
were convicted of methamphetamine possession.45 After convictions, it
became public knowledge that a chemist had engaged in conduct such as
“self-medicating with heroin sent to the crime lab for testing purposes.”46 
That chemist was the chemist who tested the substances recovered in both







42. Id. at 101.
43. Id. at 100.
44. State v. Roche, 59 P.3d 682 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002).
45. Id. at 686.
46. Id.
47. Id. 
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  49 2/5/21  12:55 PM





     
  







   
  
  
    
    
  
     
 
   
   
  
   
 
    
  
 
   
 
    




   
 
   
    
   
    
4392021] THE CHAIN OF FOOLS
The Court of Appeals of Washington later reversed, finding that “this
newly discovered evidence of [the chemist’s] malfeasance broke the chain
of custody and tainted the integrity of Roche and Sweeney’s trials.”48 
Specifically, the court observed that “a rational trier of fact could
reasonably doubt [the chemist’s] credibility regarding his testing of any
alleged controlled substances, not just heroin, and regarding his
preservation of the chain of custody during the relevant time period.”49 
Later, in Ex parte Coty, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas moved
Roche forward when considering whether a due process violation should
be presumed when a laboratory technician has committed misconduct in
another case.50 According to the court:
After thoroughly reviewing the record, the filed briefs, and cases
from other jurisdictions, we hold that an applicant can establish
that a laboratory technician’s sole possession of a substance and
testing results derived from that possession are unreliable, and we
will infer that the evidence in question is false, if the applicant
shows that: (1) the technician in question is a state actor; (2) the
technician has committed multiple instances of intentional
misconduct in another cases or cases; (3) the technician is the
same technician that worked on the applicant’s case; (4) the
misconduct is the type of misconduct that would have affected the
evidence in the applicant’s case; and (5) the technician handled
and processed the evidence in the applicant’s case within roughly
the same period of time as the other misconduct.51 
VI. RAISING THE BAR
The split of authority acknowledged by the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Texas in Ex parte Coty suggests the test that should be used for
determining whether the admissibility bar should be raised for narcotic
evidence: if the risk of forgery with narcotic evidence is similar to the
forgery risk for other evidence, and if the circumstantial evidence typically
used to admit exhibits under law not customized to narcotics is similarly
able to quell concerns regarding that risk, then the admissibility bar should
not be raised. But if there is a higher forgery risk with narcotic evidence,
or if the typical circumstantial evidence does not alleviate doubts
48. Id.
49. Id. at 690–91.
50. Ex parte Coty, 418 S.W.3d 597, 602 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
51. Id. at 605.
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  50 2/5/21  12:55 PM







   
  
 




   
     
  
   
  
   
 
     
   
   
  
   
 
  






    
   
    
   
    
  
    
    
440 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.81
concerning narcotic authorship, then the admissibility bar should be
raised.
A. The Higher Forgery Risk Associated with Drug Evidence
Assume the prosecution claims that the defendant possessed cocaine,
while the defendant claims that the cocaine is a forgery. How easy will it
be to determine whether the cocaine was forged? The Court of Criminal
Appeals of Texas relayed a finding from a trial court that a substance
losing 10.75 grams between measurements is “‘attributable to the
evaporation of chemical compounds during the thirty-one . . . month
period between the initial analysis and reanalysis.’”52 The U.S. Supreme
Court’s opinion in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts53 indicated that it is
not evident that “what [Massachusetts] calls ‘neutral scientific testing’ is
as neutral or as reliable as [Massachusetts] suggests.”54 The Supreme
Court backed that concern and noted that “[f]orensic evidence is not
uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.”55 
The Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a speedy trial in turn allows for
the exclusion of prejudicially delayed narcotics, meaning that “excessive
delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that
neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify.”56 The district court’s 
opinion in Bachtel indicated that sometimes “there is simply no way to
determine how the witnesses’ memories were impacted or whether the
reliability of defendant’s trial was compromised by the lapse of time.”57 In
other words, the admissibility structure is based upon the foundational
belief that the detection of forgeries is important. This supposition is borne
out by the multitude of cases in which lab technicians testify that an
anonymous substance is illegal.58 
It is uniquely easy to create, and difficult to detect, narcotic forgeries.
On most city streets, supermarkets wholesale identical items. A recent case 
in which a defendant prevailed against testimony of an expert in the visual-
52. Id. at 601 (quoting the “findings of the trial court”).
53. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
54. Id. at 318.
55. Id.
56. United States v. Bachtel, No. 13-00159-01-CR-W-FJG, 2015 WL
2151788, at *3 (W.D. Mo. May 7, 2015).
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., Colbert v. State, 547 S.E.2d 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
350050-LSU_81-2_Text.indd  51 2/5/21  12:55 PM
















    
   
    
  










   
  
  
   
 
    
    
    
    
    
4412021] THE CHAIN OF FOOLS
comparison or visual-assessment method illustrates the susceptibility of
narcotic chemistry to analysis error.59 
B. The Impracticability of Standard Admissibility
Such concerns about narcotic forgery might be acceptable if courts
applied an admissibility standard that substantially quelled concerns about
genuineness. As noted, courts typically allow for the admission of narcotic
evidence under laws not customized to narcotics. The problem is that, as
currently applied, laws not customized to narcotics are outdated rules in a
biochemical world. The following cases suggest methods to better exclude
drug evidence.
1. Dogs
First, a dog may be shown to be the reason narcotics must be excluded.
As support for this proposition, consider State v. Farmer.60 In Farmer, law
enforcement officers conducted a warrantless search of the defendant’s car
based, in part, on an alert by a drug-detection dog.61 The trial hinged on
the admissibility of the dog-alert testimony, indicating there was probable 
cause to search the car.62 The Court of Appeals of Oregon found that the
dog-alert testimony was improperly admitted because “the record d[id] not 
establish that [the dog’s] alert was sufficiently reliable to contribute to a
conclusion that there was probable cause to search defendant’s car.”63 
In the 21st century, the extraordinary has become ordinary, and the
notion that many chemical makeups are peculiarly in the knowledge of a
wild animal or small domesticated pet seems quaint. And yet, many courts
deem narcotic evidence admissible based upon the assumption of such
animal knowledge.64 
59. See, e.g., State v. Shalash, 13 N.E.3d 1202, 1203 (Ohio Ct. App. 2014)
(reviewing the trial court’s decision not to grant the request for a Daubert hearing
on a motion in limine to exclude the state’s expert testimony on whether the
substances seized from his premises by police were in fact controlled substance
analogs).
60. State v. Farmer, 311 P.3d 888 (Or. Ct. App. 2013).
61. Id. at 889.
62. Id. at 890.
63. Id. at 900.
64. Id. at 893.
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442 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.81
2. Scales
Second, cases indicate that narcotics may be excluded by scale 
circumstances indicating lab problems. In State v. Richardson,65 the
district court for Hall County, Nebraska allowed for testimony regarding
the accuracy of the scale used to weigh the cocaine in part because “the
court overruled Richardson’s objection based on ‘lack of proper and
sufficient foundation, foundation contains hearsay and confrontation.’”66 
Before it was reversed, the jury found Richardson guilty, and it further
found that the weight of the mixture containing cocaine was 10.25 grams.67 
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Nebraska, Richardson alleged that the
court of appeals erred when it affirmed the district court’s admission of
evidence of the weight of the cocaine over his objection that there was not
sufficient foundation regarding the accuracy of the scale used to weigh the
cocaine.68 The state supreme court found that the chemist’s testimony was
improperly admitted because “testimony regarding general procedures
used by the laboratory was not sufficient foundation to admit her testimony
regarding the weight of the cocaine.”69 
In order for any of these rulings to hold water, it would have to be
extraordinary for anyone other than the alleged author to have possessed
the narcotics. In Regan v. State,70 this was a possibility because even
though Regan was convicted of felony possession of marijuana after being
arrested while driving, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reversed in part
after finding “the evidence insufficient as a matter of law to support a
conviction of constructive felony possession.”71 In United States v. 
Pecina,72 the district court acknowledged that the quantity of drugs is
relevant and most often will be offered in the government’s case-in-chief,
because it must be proved to a jury and will impact the charge.73 Moreover,
in Pecina, the government tried to request to videotape the defense
expert’s work in weighing and testing the drugs.74 A request to videotape
the defense expert’s work is more than ironic given that crime laboratories
65. State v. Richardson, 830 N.W.2d 183 (Neb. 2013).
66. Id. at 185.
67. Id. at 186.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 190.
70. Regan v. State, 350 P.3d 702 (Wyo. 2015).
71. Id. at 710.
72. United States v. Pecina, 302 F.R.D. 492 (N.D. Ind. 2014).
73. Id. at 494.
74. Id. at 496.
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4432021] THE CHAIN OF FOOLS
do not provide videotape of the lab, and the crime labs are where the
misconduct occurs.
All of these cases reinforce the reality that we live in a world in which 
almost no chemical makeup is certain. Moreover, once material is
collected from the scene, the word “almost” can be removed from the
previous sentence. Thus, it seems appropriate to raise the bar on exactly
what type of information allows for admissibility under laws not
customized to narcotics.
For instance, in State v. Irwin,75 “during a trial in Kent County
Superior Court, it was discovered that drug evidence had been in a sealed 
envelope stored at the Chief Medical Examiner’s Office Controlled
Substances Unit (‘OCME drug lab’) was missing, despite their being no
appearance of tampering.”76 Someone had replaced the actual drugs that
were seized with blood-pressure pills.77 One subsequent investigation
uncovered “multiple issues at the OCME drug lab relating to the storage
of the evidence, security at the lab, documentation of the evidence’s arrival
at and movement within the lab, and other failures in protocol.”78 
Irwin reflects the reality of modern crime labs and the fact that
scientific hypothesis is truly hypothesis, especially in the realm of narcotic
chemistry. Courts should not rely on lab reports and someone’s testimony
to conclude that the facts contained in the report are genuine and that the
drug was in fact in the possession of the alleged author of the narcotic
substance. 
3. Analysis Equipment
The analysis equipment used on drugs may indicate inadmissibility.
In some cases involving the admissibility of narcotic evidence, however, 
courts have tried to extend the protection of analysis equipment to a
formula—the forensic formula—that is less hospitable to this type of
process. For instance, in People v. Pope,79 the trial court found that the
failure of police to preserve for testing an apparently empty chemist’s tray 
on which screening tests had been conducted deprived the defendant of
due process of law and required dismissal.80 Meanwhile, the Supreme
Court of Colorado found that if the trial court concludes that the
defendant’s due process rights were violated, under either the U.S. or
75. State v. Irwin, No. 1309012464, 2014 WL 6734821 (Del. Nov. 17, 2014).
76. Id. at *1.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. People v. Pope, 724 P.2d 1323 (Colo. 1986).
80. Id.
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444 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol.81
Colorado Constitution, because the officer failed to preserve the residue
of the field test, then the trial judge must decide on the appropriate
sanction.81 
This case illustrates two problems with applying a liberal version of
the law on analysis equipment to narcotic evidence. Under the traditional
law of analysis equipment, one would want to preserve the material
because the material has intrinsic legal value. In these cases, the material
would be put back on the market through the likelihood that someone else
could legally use the original.
Conversely, because narcotics do not have similar characteristics, and
because narcotics can only be sold on black markets, people like the law
enforcement official in Pope are trying to get rid of the narcotics as fast as
they can. In Commonwealth v. Scott,82 the chemist “deliberately 
committed a breach of lab protocols by removing the samples from the
evidence locker without following proper procedures,”83 and the same
chemist “forged an evidence officer’s initials.”84 Courts such as the Scott
court also seem to grasp the way that crime labs work in applying the
analysis-equipment doctrine. For a crime lab to report accurate
information, the chemist cannot burglarize the drug lockers or pilfer the
evidence vault to get high. On the other hand, crime labs generally do not
feature video cameras that can be copied or re-shared with anyone who
needs them, who is usually anyone with a cocaine charge, even if the
person already entered a plea. Therefore, the fact that a chemist said that a
given substance is illegal says nothing more than that the chemist thought
the defendant’s cocaine was admissible.
One of the few courts to recognize the problems with applying a liberal
version of the law on analysis equipment to narcotic evidence was an 
appellate court in Illinois in People v. Raney.85 In Raney, the court noted
that in a controlled substance prosecution, the State must present sufficient
evidence that the substance at issue is in fact a controlled substance, and
the court also found that “the State failed to prove defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt based on the lack of proper foundation for [the
expert’s] opinion that the substance in the 14 packets contained cocaine.”86 
Given the difference between a letter and one kilogram of cocaine,
courts should apply something approximating the more rigorous analysis
utilized by the courts in Scott and Raney. It should not be enough that the
81. Id. at 1327.
82. Commonwealth v. Scott, 5 N.E.3d 530 (Mass. 2014).
83. Id. at 536.
84. Id.
85. People v. Raney, 756 N.E.2d 338 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
86. Id. at 339–41.
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4452021] THE CHAIN OF FOOLS
alleged author was identified with cocaine by a chemist; instead, courts
should require additional evidence that links the alleged author to the
cocaine.
Many courts today use a less rigorous analysis that only requires
identification by a chemist to admit narcotic evidence. There are at least a
few problems with applying this analysis to narcotic evidence. The
defendant could be singled out because his grocery flour comes back as
cocaine, for example.
The analysis equipment may indicate inadmissibility or more. As 
support for this proposition, consider Commonwealth v. Fernandez,87 a 
case in which Carlos Fernandez was charged with possessing cocaine with
intent to distribute.88 The government was allowed to admit certificates of
analysis without calling the technicians who performed the laboratory tests
to testify.89 After Carlos was convicted, the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts that certificates of analysis are
testimonial statements the admission of which must be accompanied by
live testimony that can be confronted.90 In Fernandez, the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed, “As to the certificate of analysis
admitted to prove that the plastic bag found under the seat of [Carlos’s]
automobile was cocaine, it was the only evidence of the identity of the
bag’s contents.”91 The court noted, “Without question, the admission of
the certificate of analysis was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”92 
The court ordered Carlos’s convictions reversed.93 
Fernandez should not be read for the proposition that a chemical
analysis can never be used to admit particular narcotic content given the 
abundance of misconduct in crime laboratories. But, if a case features
evidence of prior or subsequent self-medicating or stealing drugs; “dry
labbing,” or falsifying test results at the same time; or interested third
parties accessing the lab, then the proponent should have to present
evidence of something beyond the testimony of a chemist or the criminal
background of the alleged author.
87. Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 934 N.E.2d 810 (Mass. 2010).
88. Id. at 812.
89. Id. at 822.
90. Id. (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009)).
91. Id. at 823.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Courts are at a crossroads with regard to the admissibility of narcotic
evidence. Most courts cling to the belief that the risk of forgery of narcotic
evidence is no different than the forgery risk of other types of evidence,
and they continue to apply an admissibility standard put in place when the
“theory of science” was still primarily a theory. A few courts, however,
are beginning to recognize that law not customized to narcotics is an
outdated rule in a biochemical world that must be ratcheted up to address
both an organic world where no substance identity is certain and a
formula—the forensic formula—where controlled substances are fungible
and highly susceptible to dry labbing. This Article is a first attempt at
addressing how to raise the bar on the admissibility of narcotic evidence.
